

# **Aulas 7-8**


Recessão de 1973-5  
e crise financeira de 2008  
(recessão a partir de 2009)

Crises e ciclos económicos

# **A recessão de 1973-5**

# As décadas anteriores à crise registaram o maior crescimento (16 economias mais avançadas)

historically low (see Figure 15.1). Figure 17.10 shows data from 1820 to 1913 for 13 advanced countries, and for 16 countries from 1950.



**Figure 17.10** *The golden age of capitalism in historical perspective.*

Source: Table 2.1 in Glyn, Andrew, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz, and Ajit Singh. 1989. 'The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age.' In *The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience*, edited by Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet Schor. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

# Os grandes fatores de crise:



fim de Bretton Woods (1971)


demissão de Nixon (agosto de 1974)

fim da guerra do Vietname (abril 1975)

subida dos preços petróleo

recessão mundial (1973-5)


# Financial crash USA




# 1973-7 recessão USA

## Industrial Production & Corporate Profits During the 1973-1975 Recession

Source: US Federal Reserve




# Recession and real interest rates (USA 1971-1981)



# Antes e depois do ponto de viragem (1974)

Before and after the second slump



E, desde então, várias crises, provocadas no sistema bancário ou financeiro (1987), ou das dívidas soberanas (1990s)

# A history of crashes

- October 1987, the Black Monday
- October 1989, a US crash
- October 1997, the Asian crash
- October 1998, the Russian crash
- April 1999, the Japan crash
- April 2000, Nasdaq
- Dec.2000/Jan.2001, crashes in Argentina and Turkey
- April 2001, the start of a world recession
- September 2001, the attack against New York
- July 2003, general recession
- January 2008, subprime crash plus world recession

1987, exemplo de crise especulativa...

e depois outras crises especulativas



# A segunda-feira mais negra desde 1987



Ministro das Finanças garante segurança das poupanças depositadas nos bancos • Bolsa de Lisboa regista a maior queda desde a sua criação • Falta de coordenação à escala europeia coloca o maior desafio de sempre ao euro • Intervenções públicas nos bancos multiplicam-se na Europa • *Págs. 2 a 5*

**Profissões**  
**Preparação das aulas trocada pelas avaliações**


■ O novo sistema de avaliação está a alterar os hábitos dos professores e a dar mais tempo de preparação às aulas. Muitos começam as reuniões e a burocracia e os alunos, que também estão a mudar. Os resultados são melhores em termos de qualidade, mas os professores estão a perder tempo em tarefas que não são essenciais. Há quem considere a sua avaliação, mas quem não o faz, não o faz. Há quem considere a sua avaliação, mas quem não o faz, não o faz. Há quem considere a sua avaliação, mas quem não o faz, não o faz.

**Cambridge School**  
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Ano lectivo inscrições abertas

**Economia**  
**Autoeuropa vai parar por falta de encomendas**

■ A Autoeuropa vai parar no próximo mês devido à paralisação das encomendas. A empresa europeia vai parar a produção de veículos, principal motor do mercado de bens de consumo de luxo. A fábrica, que já tinha reduzido a sua produção no mês passado, produzirá apenas 200 unidades no mês de outubro e novembro. • *Economia, 25*



Crise do subprime (2007-8) e  
recessão (2009-13)

# 2007-2008 Crisis do subprime

# THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 • VOL. CCLXI NO. 38



## Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG Seeks to Raise Cash

Fed Will Expand Its Lending Arsenal in a Bid to Calm Markets; Moves Cap a Momentous Weekend for American Finance

The American financial system was shaken to its core on Sunday as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. faced the prospect of liquidation, and Merrill Lynch & Co. agreed to be sold to Bank of America Corp.

The U.S. government, which talked with Freddie Mac and Fitch the day earlier and earlier about the sale of Bear Stearns Cos. to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. in March, played much tougher with Lehman. It refused to provide a financial backstop for the firm.

Without such support, Barclays PLC and Bank of America, the two most interested buy-

ers, walked away. On Sunday night, Bank of America struck a deal to buy Merrill Lynch for \$25 billion, at about \$10 a share. Lehman was working on a possible takeover by Citigroup Inc. that would allow some of its subsidiaries to continue operating as the firm is wound down.

Though it seemed clear at a bailout, the Federal Reserve is expected to take more steps to stabilize the broader financial system. Those steps, expected to be reported, would make it easier for banks and investment firms to borrow from the central bank by using a wider range of collateral. Markets say these financial institutions might have their own funds as they worked their way through the weekend.

In addition, it might con-

tinued and investment banks announced Sunday night that they would lend \$70 billion of their own money to create a borrowing facility. The 10 bank coalition, which includes Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, could tap the pool to help them ride out the crisis. The banks also said they are already committed to trying to reinstate market liquidity.

A batch of late-blooming gripped Wall Street as top executives feared collateral damage from a Lehman liquidation. Attention was focused on Merrill Lynch, which boasts the largest slice of fixed brokers, and American International Group Inc., the insurance giant. Bank firms have seen their credit get slashed overnight that they

needed capital.

"Monday will be a day of reckoning for the financial markets," said Charles McElroy, senior managing director of KIP Capital, a boutique investment firm in New York. On Sunday, he said, "it was like a fire storm was at our people's back."

All overnight spent the weekend trying to raise cash, either from their own or a capital infusion from private equity firms, or both. All were without much luck. Many hoped to see if they could transfer capital from some of the institutions in the holding company.

An Wall Street spread across Wall Street that Lehman might's survival, brokerage firms, hedge funds and other

traders started to disengage themselves from trades with Lehman. When hopes of a bailout were dashed, a quiet battle on Wall Street turned into a war zone. Investors and traders hurried to close out of their positions. Some started to cancel outstanding contracts with Lehman and to gauge their overall exposure.

Merrill, whose brokerage has a long history of "standing by" clients, quickly altered its disclosure with Bank of America, which has several bank branches operating that want to come and has long owned Merrill. Wall Street observers said the Federal Reserve may have been involved in orchestrating the sale, figuring that it was "better to have the sale than have it go to court."

— [Wall Street Journal](#) (page 2)

### Ultimatum By Paulson Sparked Frantic End

One of the most contentious moments in Wall Street's history began Friday, when Federal officials decided to deliver a no-holding-message to the owners of Lehman. There would be no government bailout of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

Officials wanted to prepare the market for the possibility that Lehman could simply fail. The best way to do that in an orderly way would be to get ready now together as a team.

Tuesday Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and top New York businessmen, Timothy Geithner, announced some 30 Wall Street executives for a 6 p.m. Sept. 16 meeting at the Park

What's News—

Business & Finance      World-Wide


### Bank of America to Buy Merrill

# Versão de KAL (The Economist) sobre o ciclo económico nos EUA




# Uma explicação do subprime

<http://vimeo.com/3261363>



# As economias desenvolvidas desaceleraram desde há algum tempo (ver o “turning point” de 1974)



# O diretor financeiro do Goldman Sachs que viu e não percebeu

Em agosto de 2007, David Viniar, do Goldman Sachs, detetou perturbações estranhas no mercado bolsista. Viniar foi vice-presidente executivo e diretor financeiro durante catorze anos (1999-2013). Ao longo de vários dias, as oscilações nalgumas ações foram tão grandes que não eram mensuráveis com o sismógrafo grosseiro dos analistas das empresas financeiras.

Um dos fundos especulativos da empresa perdeu 27 % do valor numa questão de dias, e o banco teve de injetar de imediato dois mil milhões de dólares de capital próprio nesse fundo. Em defesa desse ato, Viniar explicou: «**Passámos dias seguidos a ver coisas com 25 desvios-padrão**».

(de “Sombras”)

# Uma crise deste tipo é provável?


Um acontecimento de perda com dois desvios-padrão deve ocorrer aproximadamente 2,5 % das vezes, ou, mais ou menos, a cada 44 dias; um acontecimento com cinco desvios-padrão deve ocorrer só a cada 13 932 anos; um acontecimento com dez desvios-padrão só deveria acontecer uma vez a cada 525 mil bilhões de milénios (por comparação, estima-se que o universo tenha entre 12 e 14 mil milhões de anos).

O intervalo de tempo esperado entre dois acontecimentos com 25 desvios-padrão é de mais milénios do que as partículas existentes no Universo.


# Os antecedentes imediatos: inflação financeira

GRÁFICO 8.8.  
ACTIVOS FINANCEIROS EM % DO PIB MUNDIAL

Unidade: trilhões de dólares



# Algumas crises especulativas




Source: Elliot Wave International, Yale SOM, St. Louis FRED, GlobalFin, and Convoy analysis

# O antecedente do crescimento do shadow banking (que é onde se desencadeia o crash)

## Rise of the shadow banks

Non-bank finance continues to grow

■ Shadow banking as a proportion of GDP



Source: FSB Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016.

Note: based on submissions from 27 jurisdictions, not including Luxembourg, China

Bloomberg 

# The Lehman Brothers ignition


- 2009 the worst recession of the last 80 years
- The first time since WWII that World GDP declined
- “Irrational exuberance”, Robert Shiller
  
- Did the regulators and central banks help generate the crisis?

# Crise de 2008-9 comparada com a de 1929

## Les misérables

Severity index, selected financial crises:

- Real GDP per person, % decrease from peak to trough
- Number of years to regain pre-crisis level of output\*




Source: Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff

\* Forecasts, except for US and Germany

# Entre meados de 2007 e o fim de janeiro de 2009, a redução da capitalização dos principais bancos



GRÁFICO 8.7.  
CAPITALIZAÇÃO DOS PRINCIPAIS BANCOS




Fonte: Bloomberg, 20 de Janeiro de 2009, e JP Morgan

# Leverage

2

## No lever required


Britain's:




Sources: "Optimal Bank Capital",  
by D. Miles et al, 2012;  
Bank of England

\* Ratio of total assets  
to shareholders' claims


# Concentração bancária nos EUA em consequência do crash



# Produção industrial mundial (comparação 1929 e 2008-9)




# 1929 e 2008: na Europa foi pior (até 2015)




# Recessão na Grécia

## Greece's GDP

Greek recession v others  
100=start of economic crisis



Change on a year earlier  
%




Sources: Angus Maddison, University of Groningen; Greek National Statistics; Haver Analytics; IMF



# Que recuperação?

average industrial production performance for the large Eurozone states.  
The decline back into negative growth is clear.


## Eurozone: Industrial Production



But more telling is their assessment (drawn from two separate sources – proprietary research services) that:


Bill Mitchell blog, <http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=41372>

# Que recuperação?



**Então, o que é que desencadeou a crise e a recessão?**

# Rate of profit (two measures: 1 Duménil, 2 Shaikh) 1955-2015, US







FIGURE A


## Disconnect between productivity and a typical worker's compensation, 1948–2014



**Note:** Data are for average hourly compensation of production/nonsupervisory workers in the private sector and net productivity of the total economy. "Net productivity" is the growth of output of goods and services minus depreciation per hour worked.

**Source:** EPI analysis of data from the BEA and BLS (see technical appendix for more detailed information)


# % of financial profits in total profits, 1955-2015 USA



... and Gross Value Added of Domestic Corporate Business in Current and Chained Dollars”; “Table 6.1. Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization”; “Tables 6.16A, 6.16B and 6.16C: Corporate Profits by Industry,” National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).


# Profit without accumulation

Graphique n°10 : profit et accumulation (Etats-Unis + Europe + Japon)<sup>56</sup>




# O efeito da recessão em Portugal

**Figura 5 – Evolução do crescimento do PIB (Portugal/zona euro em %)**




**Figura 4 – Evolução do salário médio real em Portugal durante o período do euro (2000=100)**



Fonte: OCDE

# Desigualdade em Portugal



# Bibliografia

- *Sombras*: caps 1-2-3 e Anexo I